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Analysis of Gender Wage Differential in China’s Urban Labor Market 
 
This paper estimates the gender wage gap and its composition in China’s urban labor market 
using the 2009 survey data from the Chinese Family Panel Studies. Several estimation and 
decomposition methods have been used and compared. First, we examine the gender wage 
gap using ordinary least square regression method with a gender dummy variable. Then, we 
apply Oaxaca (1973) decomposition method with different weighting systems to analyze the 
logarithmic wage differential. To be more specific, we prove the existence of sample selection 
bias caused by the female’s labor force participation. We eliminate it by using the Heckman’s 
two-step procedure. Empirical results reveal that male workers generally receive a higher 
wage than female workers, and a great deal of this difference is unexplained. Meanwhile, this 
unexplained part, which is usually referred to as discrimination turns out to be higher when 
the adjustment is made for the selection bias. A further breakdown of the wage gap shows 
that among all the individual characteristics, occupations explain the largest share of the 
wage gap, followed by their working experience. On the other hand, education acts as a 
contributor for discrimination in the labor market. 
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China has one of the largest labor forces in the world with a population of about 1.37 
billion. According to the China Statistical Yearbook 2011, more than half of them are in 
employed in 2011. Though the setting of employment has changed substantially over 
the past 3 decades, full-time employment for women in China has been the norm for 
the past five decades (Fang, 2005). The data of female labor participation from 1980 to 
2009 is reported in Table 1. According to this data, around 70% of the females in China 
join the labor force. This is relatively high compared to many other countries around 
the globe. However, this apparent equality is quantitative rather than qualitative, with 
the majority of women clustered at the lower end of the job ladder. Along with the 
reformations in the labor market women encounter increasingly blatant discrimination 
in the stages of recruitment, payment, promotion and retirement.   
Chinese social scientists have followed the changes of the women’s employment and 
their wages relative to men. Women’s Studies Institute of China indicates that women 
have lower average earnings than men. Ever since the economic transformation of 
China started, the average male-female earning differentials are widening. According to 
the data sorted out from the Chinese Family Panel Studies (CFPS), the average male 
wage is around 2,810 yuan
1
The urban labor market in China has grown massively in the past 3 decades as a result 
of economic development and migration flows leading to an increased wage gap and 
inequality. Theoretically, the gender wage gap is due to the differences in individual 
endowments as well as gender discrimination. Most of the studies done on China’s 
urban labor market pointed out that gender wage differential and wage discrimination 
have risen from the 1990’s (Gustafsson and Li, 2000; Liu, Xin and Zhang, 2000; Zhang, 
2004, among others). However, in recent decade, the general environment of the labor 
market is turning better for the females. The improvement is accompanied by the 
enforcement of the Labor Laws in China, agreement of International Labor 
  per month, while the average female wage is around 2,319 
yuan per month. This is corresponds to only 82.5 percent of the male’s average 
earnings.   
Wage differential has long been noted and debated. Many studies are in place to explain 
the causes of variations in wages and earnings among gender, race, and union 
membership, etc. Many factors have been identified as responsible for this state of 
earning differential affairs apart from the obvious difference in capability between the 
males and females. These include the employers’ objectives and their concerns for 
profit maximization/cost minimization, the absence of an effective enforcement 
mechanism for equal opportunity legislation, gender bias in employment policies and 
workplaces, unequal education and on-job training opportunities and promotion 
possibilities, male dominated networks and decision making, as well as traditional 
social values.     
                                                             
1On December 8, 2011, US$1 is valued 6.34 yuan.   3 
 
Conventions related to the protection of women and equal opportunities in employment, 
and increasing concerns on female workers’ welfare. Therefore in this study, we are 
interested in the current state of the gender wage gap. Is the pay discrimination against 
the female workers getting smaller? To what extent can this differential be explained by 
the individual characteristics? These questions are of primary concern for both 
researchers as well as decision makers.   
Our objective is to provide a more accurate and up-to-date estimation of the wage 
differential in urban China. In particular, we apply recent SFPS survey data and use 
different estimation and decomposition methods to analyze the wage gap. This paper 
improves our understanding on the extent of wage discrimination in the labor market in 
China. It also helps us to identify the most influential factors contributing to the wage 
differential. Information about wage gap is important for the government to formulate 
policies for eliminating gender inequality and promoting a more equalized labor market 
in China.   
The following section provides a background of the labor market in China. In Section 3 
we provide an overview of the literature on wage differential. Section 4 introduces the 
data that we used for the empirical analysis. Section 5 describes models and Section 6 
provides analysis of the empirical results. Finally, conclusion and some policy 
suggestions are given in Section 7. 
 
2. Labor Market and Gender Wage Differential in China 
Central planning and labor market regulation over the past years, is marked by assigned 
jobs and equalized wages. Women in China enjoyed a greater degree of gender equality 
in the workplace, compared to their counterparts in the competitive market economies. 
The enhanced equality was although limited to low and middle rank levels of 
employment. While several changes have taken place in the labor market in the recent 
years aiming to revive China’s economy, women in China have begun to loss their 
previous better equality advantages. These major changes are described below.   
Firstly, in the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, the amount of state-owned enterprises 
(SOE) has been acquisitioned by private companies. From Table 1, we can observe that 
the share of SOE fell sharply from 73.6% to 51.1% from 1995 to 2009. During this 
reform, millions of workers were laid-off or forced to an early retirement, many of 
them consequently became bewildered and unsuccessful job seekers. This radical 
downsizing of the state-owned corporations and public institutions were accompanied 
by a series of reforms in the human resource policies and practices in the state sector. 
These were introduced to cancel out the erosion of job security and welfare provision 
and it tightened the performance management as well as it eased the transformation 
process. Still, in the face of these changes, female laid-off workers find it hard to 
survive in the ever fierce competition against their male counterparts and other younger 
job seekers. Most of them have to accept a wage cut in order to get employed and they 4 
 
crowd up in the low paid service sector. Some of them stay out of the labor market and 
rely on their husband’s income or the tiny government support and subsidies. And very 
few females after losing their employment, if they are financially capable try to run 
small private businesses.       
The second major change has been the rapid growth of private sectors with the 
presence of diverse ownership forms, namely multinational corporations, international 
joint ventures, domestic private firms, self-employed businesses. We can see a stunning 
expansion of these units from 1980-2009 that within 3 decades they grew from zero to 
nearly a half share of the total urban employment units. The labor market is becoming 
more competitive and flexible. Majority of the workers are categorized by their gender, 
experience, residence-status
2
These findings also imply that the enterprise behavior in the market environment also 
affects the wage structure. Enterprises aim to maximize profits and have the autonomy 
for hiring people and deciding the level of compensation; they value, for whatever 
reason, female workers less than male workers, and thus hire fewer women or pay them 
less. If the differences in education and other individual characteristics cannot explain 
  and market capability. The market economy gives rise to 
different treatments according to the employers, workers and consumers’ 
discriminatory taste. This places female workers and those with origin in rural in a 
unfavorable position.   
Third, continuous urbanization and labor surplus in the agricultural sector has attracted 
an influx of migrant rural workers to the rapidly growing urban areas. Due to low skills 
and lack of education these migrants overcrowd in low-paid segments of the job market. 
Hence, they pose huge challenge against urban female workers, who are captured by an 
increase in the share of urban population (see Table 1). This is because most of the 
migrants are males, who are stronger and willing to accept lower wages than urban 
females. Moreover, they can spare employers’, the consideration of bearing child and 
early retirement policies if their employees are females. Thus an increasing trend in the 
migrant inflows from rural to urban places lowers the possibility for females to get a 
job in the first place and lowers the level of payment to females.   
Several studies which started from the 1970s in China prove the level of impact of the 
economic reform and the development of wage differential. Maurer-Fazio et al. (1999) 
suggested that the higher the level of market-oriented reform in the work unit, the wider 
will be the gender wage gap in the urban labor market. Zhang (2004) found out similar 
results and he further identified sub-groups of employees who suffer from the growing 
wage gaps. These are among, the lower educated, over-forty-year old, non-sector 
workers, and blue-collar workers. On the other hand, Gustafsson and Li (2000) found 
out that young women and women with limited education have especially deteriorated 
during the transformation when compared to men having the same characteristics. 
                                                             
2  It depends on individual’s birthplace containing two types of status: one is rural and the other one is 
urban. One can tell the residence-status though a certification of the  Chinese citizenship, so-called 
Hukou.   5 
 
the entire wage differential between the genders, evidence of discrimination is said to 
be present in the labor market 
The type of work unit is another contributor for the wage differentials.State-owned 
units behave differently from their non-state counterparts which operate in business 
environment with a closer resemblance to a competitive labor market. Meng (1998a) 
proved that one third of the gender earnings differentials are attributable in full to the 
discrimination for those employees whose jobs were assigned by the local governments, 
while two-thirds can be attributed to the discrimination on the part of workers who 
obtained jobs through individual job-searching efforts. Another reason for gender wage 
differential addressed by Meng  (1998b) was gender occupational segregation 
suggesting that females usually crowded in lower paid jobs. Wang and Cai (2008) 
studied the gender wage differential in the inter-sectors and intra-sectors dimensions. 
By comparison they pointed out that the main source of lower earnings for females lied 
in the unequal pay within the sectors and the earnings gap due to the differences in the 
sectoral attainment was relatively small. 
It is apparent that China’s reforms and opening up of its economy has had significant 
effects on the labor market. While some workers are facing a greater level of 
employment insecurity and worsening conditions, others are presented with wider 
occupational choices, job mobility and higher rewards for their skills and education. 
Employers in general are encountering increasing pressure for quality, adaptability, and 
performance enhancement. This calls for the need of equality in the labor market and 
more complete legislation to protect the labors’ rights in China.   
 
3. Theoretical Background 
Wage differential, this common phenomenon in the labor market around the world has 
spawned a rich literature on its development and sources. On one hand, it is important 
to specify the determinants of wage which can be used to narrow the gap. On the other 
hand, it is crucial to find the explanations to quantify significant wage differences 
between the groups which are not justified by differential productivity and human 
capital investment. This unexplained part is mainly referred to as discrimination. Thus 
it is important through various policies and regulatory measures to reduce the 
non-human capital and productivity related portion of the wage gap.   
At the theoretical level there are three main economic genres regarding wage 
differential. One is the neoclassical theory stemming from the work of Becker (1957) 
which suggests that the prejudice is expressed in a discriminatory taste on the part of 
employers, workers and consumers. The second one is focused on the statistical theory 
of discrimination (Aigner and Cain, 1977). The premise of this one is that firms have 
limited information about the skills of the job applicants. This gives them an incentive 
to use easily observable characteristics such as race or gender, to infer the expected 
productivity of the applicants.The last one is the segmented labor market approach, 6 
 
which can be traced back to the theory of non-competing groups in the work of Mill 
(1885). This approach moves away from the concept of competitive labor market and 
views the labor market as being split into sectors that are either dominated by male or 
female workers respectively. Examples of this approach are “job crowding” and “dual 
labor market”.   
Theoretically whether it is better to view wage differential as an outcome of essentially 
competitive situations or as a product of non-competing groups at the labor market is a 
debatable point. Yet the segmented approach has an evident weakness in it. It cannot 
address the issues on how occupations are segregated and the reasons for 
discrimination still persist or be eroded over time.   
The econometric investigation of discrimination started with Becker’s seminal study on 
economics of discrimination in 1957. Since then, the proliferation of the use of micro 
data enables economists to analyze the productivity of individuals. In particular, the 
decomposition technique which was pioneered by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) 
has frequently been applied to data acquired from various countries and at time periods 
(For examples, see Wolf and Petrela, 2004; Smith, 2002; Boraas and Rodgers, 2003; 
Bhandari and Heshmati, 2008; Jung and Choi, 2004). This method determines how 
much wage differential between two groups is attributed to the differences in the 
characteristic of each group where wage regressions are estimated separately. For 
general reviews on the measurement of inequality and its decomposition see Heshmati 
(2004a) and (2004b). Weichselbaumer  (2005) provides a meta-analysis of the 
international gender wage gap and Jone (1983) provides a critical comment on 
Blinder’s method.   
Several changes have been made with respect to the original Blinder-Oaxaca method. 
For instance, Reimers (1983) developed this model by taking account of possible 
selectivity bias due to the distinction between the offered wages and the observed 
wages. He claimed that discrimination, if affected the wage rate largely, it would 
influence the individual’s decision on working participation. Therefore, the offered 
wage would be truncated and incidental as it depends on another variable, namely, 
labor participation as a conditional variable.   
Cotton (1988) reformulated the Blinder-Oaxaca model by further breakdown of the 
unexplained part, so that both the disadvantage (discrimination) imposed on the 
minority and the advantage (benefit) bestowed on a majority can be estimated. A more 
complicated transformation of this model was driven by Neumark (1988), in which he 
considered the linkage of the Blinder-Oaxaca method to a theoretical model on the 
employers’ discriminatory behavior.   
 
4. The Data 
The data used in this paper is from a primary survey designed and conducted by the 
Peking University for the national program of Chinese Family Panel Studies (CFPS) 7 
 
which started in the early 2007. In general, the basic idea of CFPS is to understand 
social and economic changes through data at an individual, family and community 
levels. CFPS has covered most of the questions in 4 panel surveys (PSID, CDS, HRS, 
and NYLS)
3
Relatively, Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong are economically developed regions 
when compared to other regions in China. With a higher demand for labor force, these 
three regions have more institutionalized urban labor markets. Whereas, of the total 
employment, their preferential type of economic activities varies resulting in different 
contribution of male and female work force. Beijing, with its tertiary industry 
accounting for 73.2% of its gross domestic product shows little difference in the 
male-female worker proportion. Shanghai, stands as the commercial and financial 
  in the U.S. with themes covering social, economic, education, health 
issues and so forth. 
We use the data from the CFPS survey in 2009. The information is collected from the 
residents in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong on the basis of a structured 
questionnaire. To focus on wage determination in the labor market, we restrict our 
sample to civilian wages and salaried employees. In accordance with the standard 
practice, we exclude the following from the analysis: self-employed individuals, 
retirees, students, agricultural workers, the disabled, retired employees who were 
rehired and temporary unemployed workers. We also excluded all persons aged 15 or 
less (China’s labor law sets the minimum employment age at 16 years) as well as 
respondents who provided incomplete information on wages, education, age, or other 
key variables. After the above mentioned exclusions, the sample comprised of 1,533 
observations including 117 housewives and 1,416 working individuals between the 
ages of 16 (school-leaving age) and 55 (state retirement age for women) or 60 (state 
retirement age for men). For the working individuals, there are 844 men (59.6%) and 
572 women (40.4%). 
We have used a log of the average monthly wages earned from a main job, as a 
dependent variable including three regional dummies, five education level dummies 
and six occupation typed dummies. Working experience was not observed in the 
present data. Hence, we define the variable of experience as age minus the year of 
education minus 6 years. Additional variables include a set of dummy variables 
representing the type of household registration, child and marital status. A full list of 
variables and their definitions are presented in Table 2.   
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the sample data including the means and the 
categorical distribution of the individuals’ characteristics, for males, females and their 
differential, which are regarded as the determination for the wage rate. Here we briefly 
introduce several main factors based on the current available statistics.   
Regional location 
                                                             
3PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics), CDS (Common Data Set), HRS (Health and Retirement 
Survey) and NYLS (New York Law School). 8 
 
center of mainland China and it is attracting more females to become office workers. It 
is because gender distinction is less in offices than that in the factories where physical 
strength mattes more. In contrast, Guangdong has a higher need for male workers to 
work in the production and exports sectors. Guangdong owes its growth to the largest 
share of manufacturing industry and its volume of exports in China. It is interesting to 
look at the wage rate of these three areas which have relatively similar economic level 
but have different preferential in the type of industries. 
Education level   
Education is one of the traditional human capital theory variables, which acts as a 
proxy for individual competence. In this paper we define 5 ladder type sequentially 
increasing dummies for education. According to the conventional studies, education has 
a positive effect on wages, for it increases the earning capacity through its effect on an 
individual’s productivity. We also expect an increase in the wage rate along with a 
higher level of educational attainment. However, education has an ambiguous effect in 
terms of explaining the gender wage gap in China. Zhang (2004) found out that from 
1986 to 1993, the power of education to explain wage gap increased from 2.3% to 5%, 
but there was a fall back to 2% in 1997. Xie and Yao (2005) argued education can 
explain a small amount of the gender wage gap in 2002. Chen and Hamori (2008a) also 
found education contributed to the discrimination in the labor market in 2005 (see also 
Li et al, 2005). From Table 3, we can see that females in China enjoy a higher 
education attainment than their male counterparts. The difference becomes evident in 
the attainment of the college diploma. The largest gap can be observed in the university 
education, showing that a larger proportion of the female workers achieved the 
Bachelor’s degree. Though it is meaningful for females in China to get equal or more 
education opportunities than males, given that females earn less than the males, we 
expect that education levels have negative effects on the explanation of the gender 
wage gap.   
Work experience 
Experience is the other traditional variable in the human capital theory, which is proved 
to have a non-linear relationship with wage in an earning equation. This is to an extent 
that work experience is an investment in an on-the-job training. Incentives for this form 
of human capital accumulation declines with age. The principal reason is that the 
present value of any returns-to-training investment declines as the residual work-life of 
the worker decreases. Thus, a positive sign on experience and a negative sign on 
squared-experience are expected. In our sample, in an average, males possess more 
than 4 years of experience when compared to females. This is attributed to longer 
schooling period for females, lower pension age and motherhood leaves. Most of the 
literatures found that experience can explain the gender wage differential to a certain 
degree (Zhang, 2004; Xie and Yao, 2005; Chen and Hamori, 2008a).   
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Type of occupation 
The skill of an individual worker is assumed to play an important role  for higher 
earning opportunity (Wang, 2005; Gustafsson and Li 2000; among others). We separate 
the observations into 6 categories of occupations including two types of workers in 
service industry, low/high-skilled workers in the manufacturing industry, and 
junior/senior professionals. A positive relationship between the monthly wage and the 
complexity of the job is expected. Generally, it is more common, that females work in 
the service industry than males. Moreover, manufacturing industry has a larger number 
of male workers than females. This is attributed to the physical difference between 
genders. However, it is surprising to find more men working as senior professionals 
than females despite females receiving more tertiary education than the males. We can 
see that the lower levels job in occupations with higher knowledge and higher social 
status (e.g. physicians, scientist, university professors, etc.) are usually filled by 
females who are already in the minority group in those occupations. This partially 
reflects the fact that females in China have lower status jobs after graduation. Even 
when they find the right track of professional career, they fail to be promoted as quickly 
or as frequently as their male counterparts (Fang, 2005).   
Household Registration Type 
China for about 40 years had isolated rural and urban economies from each other. One 
cause for segregation is the strict Household Registration System, which required 
individuals to register with the local authorities to gain residency and thereby, 
determined where people lived and worked. (Meng and Zhang, 2001) Even if the 
restrictions on rural-urban migration have been eased in the late 1980’s; this old system 
remains potent. It continues to serve as one of the key institutions perpetuating China’s 
rural-urban disparity. Discrimination against rural migrants in terms of occupational 
attainment and wages has been found in several literatures (e.g. Wang and Zuo, 1999; 
Wang and Cai, 2006; Zhao, 2000; Xin, 1995; Chi et al., 2007). In our sample the 
proportion of urban residents for both genders are nearly the same, reaching to around 
62% of the total number of observations. As the total workforce comprises of a large 
share of migrants, it is important to capture the effect of workers’ residency on their 
monthly wages. Given an earning differential between these two groups, a positive sign 
on this dummy variable is expected when the urban residence is assigned as 1. 
Marriage and Child status 
Finally we consider the status of marriage and child for the worker assuming that 
getting married and having a child may have different effects on one’s earnings. We 
propose the hypothesis that couples usually have a larger expenditure than that of a 
single one’s. Thus the former ones may have incentive to earn higher wages. Previous 
studies have shown that, marriage had positive effects on a person’s wage rate in China 
(Chen and Hamori, 2008; Xie and Yao, 2005).   
The relationship between the children and the workers’ wage rate has seldom been 10 
 
addressed in the previously conducted wage differential studies. Previous studies, 
which mainly focused on females, found out that mothers earn lower hourly wages than 
do women without children due to less working experience and temporary part-time 
employment (Hill, 1979; Waldfogel, 1997). Here, we also consider a negative effect of 
children on males or females’ monthly wages as time and efforts are needed for parents 
to take care of their children.     
 
5. Specification of the Model   
In this section, we analyze how the various characteristics of individuals contribute to 
the gender wage differential through application and comparison of several alternative 
approaches. The first step involves the identification of whether the gender wage 
differential exists statistically and significantly or not. In doing, so we estimate the 
following Mincerianearning equation (see Heckman et al., 2003) with an additional 
gender dummy variable: 
(1)    i i i M X W ε γ β + + = ln  
where,  Wi  is the monthly wage of the worker i, Xi  is a vector of individual 
characteristics (see Table 2 for the list of the variables), Mis a dummy variable for male, 
β and γ are vectors of unknown coefficients to be estimated, and εi is a disturbance term 
which is assumed to satisfy the usual properties. The coefficient γ is the estimated 
coefficient of the gender dummy variable in this earning equation. It supposedly 
measures the wage penalty or the wage differential for the females after controlling 
several characteristics such as education, experience, occupation, marriage, child, and 
Hukou in the earnings determination.   
As mentioned previously the main objective of this paper is to analyze the composition 
of the gender wage gap and investigate how individual characteristics can explain the 
gap. Therefore to begin with, we define the gross wage differential as:   






where, Wm/Wf is the observed male-female wage ratio. Then, we introduce the standard 
Mincerian earning equation for males and females separately written as: 




i X W ε + = ln  
where, the subscript g denotes worker’s gender, g=(male, female). The variables 
included in these equations are the same as those in the equation (1) but with the 
absence of the gender dummy, M. 
Estimated wage equations for different sexes can be formulated based on the estimated 11 
 
coefficients as follows:   
(4)    f f f m m m X W and X W β β ˆ ln ˆ ln = =  
where,  W   is the geometric mean of the monthly wages,  X is a vector of the mean 
values of the regressors and β ˆ   is the vector of the corresponding estimated 
coefficients. 
By taking the log form of equation (2) the monthly wage differential between males 
and females can be expressed as: 
(5)    f f m m f m X X W W D β β ˆ ˆ ln ln ln − = − =  
Following Oaxaca (1973), the above equation can be further transformed for 
decomposition purpose as: 
(6)    ) ˆ ˆ ]( ) ( [ ] ˆ ) ( ˆ )[ ( ln f m f m f m f m X I X I X X D β β Ω Ω β Ω β Ω − + − + − + − =  
where, I is an identity matrix and Ω is a diagonal matrix of weights. This states that the 
mean difference in log monthly wage is decomposed in to two parts. One part is of the 
differential which is due to their average endowments (the first term on the right-hand 
side), and the effects of discrimination and the other omitted factors, as revealed by the 
second term.   
In general, we will get different measures to analyze the wage differential, depending 
on  the  choice  of  weights  in  the  matrix  Ω.  If  Ω=1,  it  suggests  that discrimination 
penalizes the female by preventing them from earning according to the male’s 
wage-offer  function.  If  Ω=0,  it  implies  that  the  discrimination  gives  the  male 
advantages. In another words, males are paid more than what they would get in a 
non-discriminatory world.   
These two equations represent two extreme cases. The decomposition of differences in 
earning is the estimate of what a male worker receives if he faced the female wage 
structure or vice versa. It is most likely that the real values would fall in between the 
two extreme cases. Therefore, we add Reimers’s (1983) method as a comparison. In 
this model Ω=0.5I, shows the employers’ preference for males and their distaste for 
females, distort both groups’ wages. Therefore, neither group’s observed wage-offer 
function would be likely to exist in a non-discriminatory world. Following the 
Reimers’s method the wage differential in (6) is reduced to: 
(7)    ) ˆ ˆ ]( [ 5 . 0 ] ˆ ˆ )[ ( 5 . 0 ln f m f m f m f m X X X X D β β β β + − + − + =  
Moreover, Reimers pointed out that if participation in the labor market is not random, 12 
 
then the estimation is subject to sample selection bias. In our case, this problem occurs 
when we take in to consideration the female worker’s population. Women with higher 
expected wage rate or those who prefer to be a housewife are reluctant to join the labor 
force. As a result, their wages may not be observed and this absence would affect the 
to-be-estimated wage structure. To encounter this kind of selective problem Reimers 
(1983) applies Heckman (1979) two-step selection correction estimation procedure (see 
also Wooldridge, 2006). The first step is to specify a labor force participation equation 
for women in the form of a probit function in order to get an inverse Mill’s ratio to 
correct the possible selection bias. Specifically, the dependent variable is a binomial 
variable assigned as 0 if the female is a housewife and as 1 if the female works. 
Explanatory variables include dummies for the region, education level, Hukou, 
Marriage and Child status. Experience and occupations are not considered for 
housewives who have no related information. The second step involves estimation of 
the wage equation by OLS with the inverse of the Mill’s ratio (MR), which is predicted 
from the probit function as an additional explanatory variable. Here the sample is 
limited to only females working. With the adjustment term, the equation (1) and (4) 
changes into the following forms:   






i R M X W ε δ + + = ln  
(9)    f f f f f R M X W δ β ˆ ˆ ln + =  
and the wage gap decomposition in equation (7) changes as: 
(10)  f f f m f m f m f m R M X X X X D δ β β β β ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ]( [ 5 . 0 ] ˆ ˆ )[ ( 5 . 0 ln − + − + − + =  
here,  δˆ   is the estimation of the covariance between the errors in the probit and wage 
equation and  R M   is the estimated inverse Mill’s ratio to correct for the selection bias 
resulting from the differences in females’ probability of working. 
 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Determinants of Monthly Wage 
The results of regressions analyses have been shown in Table 4.1 and 4.2. These tables 
contain the results of the estimated earning equation for the total sample of workers 
with a gender dummy variable, and the results of the estimated earning equations for 
females and male workers separately. For females, there are two earning equations, one 
which adjusts for the sample selection bias, while the other does not.   
From the first column of Table 4.1, we can identify the contribution of the worker’s 
characteristics and the effect of discrimination on the wage gap between the male and 
female workers. Overall, the model fits the data relatively well, and most of the 13 
 
coefficients have expected signs and are significant at less than 5% to the level of 
significance. The coefficient of gender dummy shows that male workers on an average 
earn about 5.9% more than their female counterparts, keeping the other variables a 
constant. This result confirms the existence of wage discrimination in China.   
Other characteristics have different effects on wages. Generally, workers from Beijing 
have the same wage rate as workers in Guangdong, as the coefficient is not significant 
at the 10% level of significance. However workers in Shanghai enjoy on an average a 
4.5% higher wage rate than workers from other two regions. This is consistent with the 
report given by the Scientific Socialism Research Institution in China (2011) where it 
indicated that Beijing and Guangzhou have a lower average wage and consumption 
levels than that in Shanghai. It also reflects that wage varies in the dominated sectors if 
the samples are collected randomly. For example, in the case of Shanghai, larger share 
of workers are employed in finance and commerce sector which leads to a higher wage 
rate than the other two locations, whereas Guangzhou has more workers in 
manufacturing while Beijing has more workers in education and government sectors.   
A positive association is obtained consistently between the successive higher levels of 
education. According to our results, if we set the junior/below junior graduates as the 
reference category, every upgrade in education attainment is accompanied with 5% 
increase in wage rate and with a 10% rise if one attains further studies after his 
undergraduate course. This result can be supported by Bargain et al. (2007) who proved 
the phenomenon that the average wage of the work force increased in return from the 
education level. This is due to the rapid improvement in educational attainment which 
has taken place in China.   
Experience has an inverted-U shape relationship with wage. Such relations are 
illustrated in many previous literatures (Liu, Meng and Zhang, 2000; Zhang, 2004). The 
relation is characterized by an increase in wages at a worker’s early age then the wage 
is peaked at somewhere and followed by a decrease at the later stage.  It can be 
explained that if a worker is in the labor market for a long time, the return of his 
experience is likely to fall as his skill might be out-of-date due to the rapid 
development of technology. On the other hand, his incentive for learning new skill is 
weaker than that for the younger ones. Hence, his expected returns are smaller due to 
the approaching of retirement.   
Types of occupation are the greatest contributors to the difference of wage rates. 
Various types of occupation would entail a wide range of compensation due to the level 
of skill sets required. White-Collar workers earn 11.2% higher than people who take up 
low-paid service jobs. Nevertheless, coefficient for low-skilled workers in the industrial 
sector is small and is statistically insignificant showing a similar wage rate with 
low-paid service workers. Those with special skills such as trainings in machinery, 
driving etc. receive 14.1% more than the reference group. Larger gaps can be observed 
if a person works as a professional (physicians, professor, lawyer, etc.), with 25.2% 
higher wage for the juniors and a substantial amount of 55.3% higher wage for the 14 
 
seniors.   
As expected, urban residents get higher wage rates than rural residents. Several reasons 
can be addressed to explain this phenomenon. Firstly, the productivity difference 
between the urban and rural residents is because the former usually has an easier access 
to tertiary education and more job-training opportunities in order to get a higher-paid 
job. Second, the employer’s discrimination is another contributing factor for the 
earning difference between the urban and rural immigrants (Luo, 2008). Third, the 
two-tier labor market, or labor market segregation in China yields to the inequality 
(Knight et al., 1999; West and Zhao 2000; Goh et al., 2008). Moreover, urban residents 
enjoy other advantages like wider personal networks, accommodation, and information 
for jobs etc.     
Marriage possesses an expected positive effect on the wage rate. A married worker has 
4.2% higher wage than others who are single or divorced. This difference may be 
because the couples’ expenditure is usually higher than that for singles. This, in turn 
serves as a stimulator for couples to seek for promotion or higher paid job in order to 
maintain and further improve their living standard. Also, married workers tend to be 
older than singles thus they get higher wages with longer working experience. On the 
other hand, wage rate is shown to be 6.4% lower if a worker has a child, considering 
the amount of time and energy that will be distracted from working for child rearing. 
The results of the earning function for only males are presented in the third column of 
Table 4.1, with the R-squared value of 0.5789. The coefficients of workers’ 
characteristics are similar to those attained from pooled earning function.   
In Table 4.2, we can see the results of two estimated alternative equations for female 
workers. The first column shows the results from the equation with no consideration of 
sample selection bias. While the third column presents the results generated from the 
Heckman-two step procedure adding to the negative and significant inverse Mill’s ratio 
as an explanatory variable in the second wage equation to eliminate the possible 
selection bias. On comparison the results we note that, the coefficients, other than 
experience and occupation, have changed significantly suggesting that housewives do 
induce changes to the effects of determinants for females’ wage structure. The returns 
of education becomes smaller, so as experience and type of occupations. Children and 
marriage are not significantly related to the wage rate. This indicates that if we correct 
for the bias, the females’ wage structure will change less rapidly than in a biased 
estimation. According to Reimers, we explain this situation by saying that women who 
have high-wage opportunities, given their observed characteristics, have even better 
opportunities outside the wages and salary sector. Hence, they are less likely to be 
included in the labor market.   
In the next step we present the result of the wage gap decomposition using the Oaxaca 
decomposition technique with different weights. The differences are then attributed to 
the relative endowments of human capital between the males and females and the labor 
market discrimination components.   15 
 
6.2 Decomposition of the Wage Gap 
Table 5 reports the result of decomposition of the estimated wage gap among genders. 
The total wage differential has been decomposed into two parts; the first part is due to 
the difference of genders’ endowments, and the second part is due to the differences in 
the parameters of the wage function which can be attributed to the labor-market 
discrimination and to other omitted variables. We show this measure of discrimination 
using three different sets of weights (Ω is equal to 0, 0.5 and 1.0) under two kinds of 
estimations (with and without correction for sample selection bias).   
The mean log monthly wage difference in our sample is 0.071. Since selection bias 
term is negative and significant, OLS estimates would be downward biased too, as 
would a wage-differential decomposition based on the OLS results. The correction for 
selectivity in our sample widens the gender differential to 0.116. Thus, the degree of 
underestimation of bias due to differences in the probability of women working in the 
labor market is relatively large. 
It is interesting to ask how serious is this problem of discrimination in producing these 
differences? The results from the adjusted earning function are more stable, indicating 
that discrimination accounts for around 86% percentage of the  estimated wage 
differential. While the biased functions give the results that the discrimination ranges 
from 79% to 87% averaged at 83%. These results are generally similar with those of the 
previous studies of gender wage differentials in China: for instance Chen and Hamori 
(2008a) who proved that discrimination counted to about 70% using Oaxaca method, 
and 75% using the Reimers method of the wage differential in 2005; Liu et al. (2000) 
also showed that discrimination in Shanghai labor market was about 88% using the 
men-weighted value, 93% using the female-weighted value, and 90% using the Cotton 
method in 2000. A small variation may arise from using different datasets, assigned to 
weights and methods. However, it is safe to draw a conclusion that in the past decade, 
discrimination has been a main contributor for wage differential in China’s urban labor 
market. It is obvious that the three estimates of discrimination are quite similar for the 
adjusted function. However, fluctuations in percentage of discrimination can be found 
if they are derived from functions with sample selection bias. These changes could be 
attributed to large coefficients of education and other variables in the biased earning 
functions for females.   
While discrimination remains large in  China, we try to explain the causes of this 
phenomenon in light of analyzing the effects of the personal characteristics. Table 6 
displays the effects of the individuals and the labor market characteristics on the 
explained and unexplained part of the wage differential. Though the weights are 
different the scale of the coefficients’ effects are nearly the same. 
It is surprising to find that education only accounts for 6% of the wage gap with a 
negative sign, indicating that education enlarges the wage gap between females and 
males. While in the unexplained part, education shows a positive effect and explains 23% 
of the discrimination. This is because females have higher education attainments than 16 
 
males while they are especially less paid on jobs. It is more obvious for high school 
graduates and Master or Ph.D. holders. Those two types of employees generally work 
in physical-work and senior professional areas respectively, whereas males receive 
higher wages than females. Same results have been found in Chen and Hamori (2008a). 
Another reason can be that, education acts more like a signal for an employer to 
identify a person’s ability in China’s labor market (Li et al., 2005). If a female wants to 
prove her ability, being aware of the existence of gender discrimination, she might 
resort to a higher education degree and accept a lower wage given for her educational 
attainment.    
Among all the characteristics, occupation has the strongest power in the explained part. 
This explains 27% the wage gap. It is common to find that the gender pay gaps are 
small within the narrowly-defined occupations (Gunderson, 1989). The effects in 
relation  with two types of workers are especially strong, namely the low-skilled 
workers and senior professionals. It is worth to note that, the shares of males are higher 
than the shares of females in these two types of occupations whereas males’ college and 
tertiary education attainments are less than the females. This happens when the 
discrimination of employment exists. It is reflected by preventing females from 
entering the high-wage sector in the labor market and eventually leads to the increased 
wage gap. Chen and Hamori(2008b) in the discrimination part, say that the effect is 
about 24%. Low-skilled workers and Junior professionals suffer from discrimination 
most. This can be mostly explained by males’ physical advantages and employers’ 
preferences.   
Instead of explaining the gender wage gap; experience is more likely to contribute to 
the discrimination. For parameters of regions, Beijing and Shanghai generally have the 
same amount of effects, indicating discriminations against female workers. Marriage 
explains the wage gap to a certain degree. It may suggest that Chinese women, like 
many elsewhere, bear primary responsibility for household chores and childcare 
(Loscocco and Wang, 1992). Despite the significant differentials between the married 
females and males, (our results in Table 4.2) show that married women earn more than 
single ones. This result is similar to Hughes and Maurer-Fazio’s (2002) finding where 
they explained this “marriage premium” by mentioning that employers prefer married 
workers –perhaps they view married workers as more stable and less mobile-or that the 
wage system contains equity provisions and views married workers as more needy. But 
if the second reason stands, Child should also explain the wage gap rather contribute to 
more discrimination since females’ with children have higher needs than those without. 
Thus we consider that employers may prefer married females, but once if they had 
children, they might be considered not as competitive as their counterparts and thus 
receive a lower wage. 
 
7. Conclusion and Policy Suggestions 
This paper intends to analyze the gender wage differential in China’s urban labor 17 
 
market. To attain this, first we identify the wage level and gender wage differential 
determinants using Mincerian earning function with gender dummy variable. Second 
we use Oaxaca methods with three different weighting systems to analyze the 
composition of wage differential and employ the Heckman-two-step procedure to 
eliminate the possible sample selection bias attributed to the differences in the 
probability of working.     
In the last section we have seen how much of the total gender wage differential comes 
from sources such as discrimination and those due to the individual characteristics. The 
latter category is controllable and can be impacted by policy, such as education levels, 
geographic sector and occupation; while others comes from characteristics that are 
beyond direct influence, such as experience, marriage and child status. Discrimination 
apparently is an overwhelming reason for the low wages of females. After adjustment 
for selection bias, the estimated discrimination is around 85% of the gender wage gap. 
Occupation plays an important role to explain the wage gap while education, instead of 
explaining the wage gap, is a contributor to the gender discrimination in China’s urban 
labor market. Married women earn less than their married male counterparts but they 
earn more than the unmarried females, while having children has a small effect on 
discrimination.   
It is important to note that the unexplained differential is not an exact measure of 
discrimination, as there is an absence of detailed controls for all possible relevant 
factors of job characteristics and person-specific skills. In Macpherson and Hirsch 
(1995), this differential is likely to overestimate the magnitude of discrimination. 
However, when the unexplained differential constitutes to a large percentage of the 
total differential, the possibility of gender discrimination cannot be completely ruled 
out (Blau, Ferber, and Winkles, 1998). 
What do our findings mean for those including state, associations and civil society 
organizations who are concerned about improving the economic situation of females in 
China? Firstly, anti-discrimination efforts are in all its forms needed regardless of their 
wage gap effects. Government is encouraged to reinforce the implementation of laws to 
forbid gender discrimination in terms of wages, employment, opportunities and 
promote equality; promote gender equality through mass media and education system; 
and increase the number of female employees in the public sector. Second, in light of 
our analysis, we find discrimination to be severe foremost in the high-wage sector. With 
this respect, government could encourage the enterprises to employ more female 
workers by providing various incentives. Third, while maintaining equal opportunity 
for educational attainment for both the genders, government should strive to improve 
the quality of education as well. For education, is a time and money consuming 
investment it should act as a role to improve one’s productivity rather than simple 
signaling. Only through improved quality combined with necessary incentives and 
regulations can education narrow the gender wage gap rather than increasing it. Thus 
state intervention and incentive provision and regulations are among the measures to be 18 
 
combined with education and general public awareness to tackle wage discrimination 
effectively.   
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Table 1.Economy and Labor Market Indicators for 1980-2009 
Indicator Name  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2009 
GDP per Capita (current US$)  193.02    291.77    314.43    604.23    949.18    1731.13    3748.93   
Population (billion)  0.98    1.05    1.14    1.20    1.26    1.30    1.33   
Female Labor Participation Rate  71.00    71.60    73.00    72.30    70.90    68.50    67.40   
Male Labor Participation Rate  87.50    85.90    85.00    84.90    83.60    80.90    79.70   
Total Labor Participation Rate  79.50    79.00    79.20    78.80    77.40    74.80    73.70   
Urban Population (% )  19.60    23.00    27.40    31.40    35.80    40.40    44.00   
Employment Composition in Urban Units (%) 
State-owned Units  76.80    72.70    73.60    73.60    69.80    56.90    51.10   
Collective-owned Units  23.20    26.90    25.20    20.60    12.90    7.10    4.90   
Other Owner-ship Units  0.00    0.40    1.20    5.80    17.30    36.00    44.00   
Data Sources: World Bank and China Labor Statistical Yearbook 
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Table 2.Description of all the variables in the earnings equation 
Variables    Description 
LnWage    Logarithm of the monthly wage 
Province  P1  Guangzhou; Reference group 
  P2  Takes the value of 1 if Beijing 
  P3  Takes the value of 1 if Shanghai 
Education  Edu1  Junior School or Below; Reference group 
Attainment  Edu2  Takes the value of 1 if one graduates from High School 
  Edu3  Takes the value of 1 if one achieves College Diploma (e.g. professional 
training etc.) 
  Edu4  Takes the value of 1 if one achieves Bachelor’s Degree 
  Edu5  Takes the value of 1 if one achieves Master or Ph.D. Degree 
Occupation  Occ.1  Low-wage worker in service industry (e.g waiter, babysitter, gate-man etc.); 
Reference group 
  Occ.2  Take the value of 1 if one is a staff (e.g. secretary, office staff etc.) 
  Occ.3  Take the value of 1 if one is a Low-skilled Worker (e.g. worker in 
construction site or factory etc.) 
  Occ.4  Take the value of 1 if one is a High-skilled Worker (e.g. driver, Repairer, 
Technician, Mechanic etc.) 
  Occ.5  Take the value of 1 if one is a Junior professional (e.g. Junior manager, 
Teacher, Accountant etc.) 
  Occ.6  Take the value of 1 if one is a Senior professional (e.g. Professor, Doctor, 
Manager, etc.) 
EX    Experience of working, calculated as Age-Year of education-6 
EXSQ    Experience*Experience 
HuKou    Take the value of 1 if urban, zero if rural 
Married    Take the value of 1 if married 
Children    Take the value of 1 if with child 
Female    Take the value of 1 if male 
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Characteristics  Male  Female  Difference 
Wage  2810.320  2319.220  491.100 
Log Wage  3.329  3.258  0.071 
Province:       
Guangdong  0.270  0.259  0.011 
Beijing  0.416  0.409  0.007 
Shanghai  0.314  0.332  -0.018 
Education:       
Junior &Below  0.379  0.316  0.063 
High School  0.190  0.191  -0.001 
College Diploma  0.295  0.313  -0.018 
Bachelor’s Degree  0.118  0.157  -0.039 
Master or Ph.D. Degree  0.018  0.023  -0.005 
Occupation:       
Service Worker  0.283  0.348  -0.065 
White-Collar Worker  0.102  0.178  -0.076 
Low-Skilled Worker  0.197  0.187  0.010 
High-Skilled Worker  0.188  0.040  0.148 
Junior Professional  0.114  0.180  -0.066 
Senior Professional  0.115  0.066  0.048 
Experience:       
Experience  22.662  18.320  4.342 
Squared experience  657.741  445.089  212.651 
HuKou  0.624  0.626  -0.002 
Married  0.820  0.797  0.023 
With Child  0.756  0.722  0.034 
       
Observations  844  572   24 
 
Table 4.1 Results of Regression 
  Pooled  Only Male 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient  St. Error  Coefficient  St. Error 
Intercept  2.925***  0.025  2.907***  0.032 
Region:         
Beijing  -0.010  0.013  -0.009  0.017 
Shanghai  0.045***  0.014  0.034*  0.019 
Education:         
High school  0.051***  0.015  0.048***  0.021 
College Diploma  0.115***  0.016  0.085***  0.022 
Bachelor’s Degree  0.166***  0.023  0.127***  0.031 
Master or Ph.D. Degree  0.263***  0.042  0.251***  0.058 
Occupation:         
White-Collar Worker  0.112***  0.017  0.115***  0.026 
Low-Skilled Worker  -0.009  0.015  0.012  0.020 
High-Skilled Worker  0.141***  0.017  0.147***  0.021 
Junior Professional  0.252***  0.018  0.283***  0.026 
Senior Professional  0.553***  0.022  0.573***  0.028 
Experience:         
Experience  0.010***  0.002  0.011***  0.003 
Squared experience  -0.000195***  0.0000495  -0.000216***  0.000062 
HuKou  0.082***  0.013  0.073***  0.017 
Married  0.042**  0.019  0.058***  0.026 
Child    -0.064***  0.020  -0.073**  0.026 
Gender  0.059***  0.011     
R-squared  0.6057    0.5789   
Observations  1416  844 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significant at the 1,5 and 10 per cent levels of significance. 
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Table 4.2 Results of Regression 
  Only Female (Without correction)  Only Female (With correction) 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient  St. Error  Coefficient  St. Error 
Intercept  2.862***  0.039  2.891***  0.081 
Region:         
Beijing  -0.015  0.020  -0.082**  0.040 
Shanghai  0.068***  0.020  -0.001  0.039 
Education:         
High school  0.053**  0.021  0.005  0.038 
College Diploma  0.164***  0.026  0.088*  0.048 
Bachelor’s Degree  0.221***  0.035  0.134**  0.062 
MSc or Ph.D. Degree  0.295***  0.062  0.196**  0.099 
Occupation:         
White-Collar Worker  0.094***  0.023  0.097***  0.029 
Low-Skilled Worker  -0.035  0.023  -0.025  0.028 
High-Skilled Worker  0.125***  0.040  0.133***  0.049 
Junior Professional  0.209***  0.024  0.205***  0.034 
Senior Professional  0.530***  0.036  0.519***  0.051 
Experience:         
Experience  0.011***  0.004  0.00975*  0.00570 
Squared experience  -0.000204***  0.000094  -0.000186  0.000124 
HuKou  0.091***  0.019  0.074***  0.028 
Married  0.018***  0.027  0.067  0.045 
Child  -0.056**  0.030  -0.062  0.042 
Inverse of Mills Ratio    -0.267***  0.109 
R-squared  0.6269   
Wald Chi2    272.68 
Observations  572  572 













Table 5.Results of the decompositions 
Note: Wage discrimination = Total differential – Endowment Differences 
1.  R M W W f m δ ˆ ln ln + − ; 2.  f m W W ln ln − ; 3.  m f m X X β ˆ ) ( − ; 4.  f f m X X β ˆ ) ( − ; 5. 
) ˆ ˆ )( ( 5 . 0 f m f m X X β β + − ; 6. 
biased
f f m X X β ˆ ) ( − ; 7.  ) ˆ ˆ )( ( 5 . 0
biased
f m f m X X β β + −  
   
  With Correction for   
Sample Selection Bias       
Without correction for     
Sample Selection Bias 
Component\Weights  D=I  D=0  D=0.5I  D=I  D=0  D=0.5I 














Wage discrimination  0.101  0.109  0.100  0.056  0.062  0.059 
Due to endowments, %  12.9  14.9  13.9  20.9  12.9  16.9 
Due to discrimination, %  87.1  85.1  86.1  79.1  87.1  83.1 27 
 
Table 6.Decomposition of Explained and Unexplained Part using Reimer’s Results 
Explanatory Variable  Explained  Unexplained 
Intercept    0.0160 
Region:  -0.0006  0.0413 
Beijing  -0.0003  0.0302 
Shanghai  -0.0003  0.0111 
Education  -0.0077  0.0074 
High school  0.0000  0.0082   
College Diploma  -0.0015  -0.0009   
Bachelor’s Degree  -0.0051  -0.0009   
Master or Ph.D. Degree  -0.0011  0.0011   
Occupation  0.0309  0.0276 
White-Collar Worker  -0.0081  0.0027   
Low-Skilled Worker  -0.0001  0.0070   
High-Skilled Worker  0.0207  0.0017   
Junior Professional  -0.0162  0.0114   
Senior Professional  0.0265  0.0050   
Experience  0.0026  0.0121 
Experience  0.0453  0.0283   
Squared experience  -0.0427  -0.0162   
HuKou  -0.0001  -0.0001   
Married  0.0014  -0.0068   
With Child  -0.0023  0.0029   
Total Effect  0.0161  0.1004   
Total effect, in %  13.9%  86.1% 
 